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NOTES
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM OVER NON-RESIDENT
INDIVIDUALS THROUGH SERVICE ON A
LOCAL AGENT*
On the continent of Europe the rule is almost universally fol-
lowed that when a non-resident foreigner has become a party
to dealings in a country wherein a resident claimant seeks to
secure jurisdiction, the absent defendant is amenable to suit in
that country on a cause of action arising out of his transaction
there.' That phase of jurisdiction, which in American law is
* This treatise was awarded the Mary Hitchcock Thesis Prize for 1939.
1. Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (1913) 26 Harv.
L. Rev. 193, 203, in speaking of causes of actions against non-residents
arising within the country, said: "But in spite of an occasional objection
it is clear that today, not only in Belgium and France, but in Germany
as well, as von Bar has shown, actions may be brought without regard to
the presence of the defendant, von Bar, International Law, sec. 423, 424."
Sunderland, The Problem of Jurisdiction (1926) 4 Texas L. Rev. 429,
442, in speaking of service out of the country on a non-resident defendant
against whom an action has arisen within the country, said: "This theory
of jurisdiction over foreigners who become involved in domestic transac-
tions is almost universal among European Nations. Piggott, Foreign Judg-
ments, c. 13."
The Rules of Order of the Supreme Court of England provide in Order
XI, rule 1:
Service out of the jurisdiction of a writ of summons or notice of a
writ of summons may be allowed by the Court or a Judge whenever-
e. The action is one brought against a defendant not domiciled or ordi-
narily resident in Scotland to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or other-
wise affect a contract or to recover damages or other relief for or in
respect of the breach of a contract.
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called "due process"-the "notice" factor-is considered satisfied
by extraterritorial service of notice. This practice is based on
the theory that when people have voluntarily become parties to
dealings in a foreign country it is only fair and reasonable that
they be answerable to the courts of the foreign country for
actions arising out of such dealings.
It is the purpose of this paper to consider the extent of the
operation of this or a similar principle in American law as ap-
plied to non-resident individuals who are doing business in a
foreign state through a local agent. At the outset it is important
to recall the historical background and the chronological develop-
ment of the cases pertaining to this problem. Therefore the first
part of the paper will be devoted to a presentation of the leading
cases bearing upon this problem; and then, with this background,
the second portion of the paper will deal with a more detailed
consideration and analysis of the cases with the view of indicat-
ing the probable solution of the problem, namely, whether service
on the local agent of a non-resident individual doing ordinary
business within a state will be upheld by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
I
The leading case historically is the Supreme Court case of
Pennoyer v. Neff, 2 based upon facts occurring just prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Not only is the discussion of the main
problem herein based upon that decision historically, but all sub-
sequent cases have felt its limitations and qualifications. Profes-
sor Sunderland even goes so far as to say: "In the United States
the possibility of the use of foreign service of process in ac-
cordance with the almost universal practice of other nations has
been virtually destroyed by the case of Pennoyer v. Neff."8
(1) made within the jurisdiction,
(2) made by or through an agent trading or residing within the juris-
diction on behalf of a principal trading or residing out of the juris-
diction or,
(3) by its terms or by implication to be governed by English Law or
is one brought against a defendant not domiciled or ordinarily resi-
dent of Scotland or Ireland in respect of a breach committed within
the jurisdiction of a contract wherever made, even though such
breach was preceded or accompanied by a breach out of the juris-
diction which rendered impossible the performance of the part of
the contract which ought to have been performed within the juris-
diction.
ee. The action is founded on a tort committed within the jurisdiction.
See also, Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Busi-
ness Within a State (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 909, 926.
2. (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
3. Sunderland, The Problem of Jurisdiction (1926) 4 Texas L. Rev. 429,
442.
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In that case4 a resident of Michigan owning land in Oregon
was sued in the latter state for money owed. It was sought to.
serve him by publication under an Oregon statute' which pro-
vided that service might be had on a non-resident defendant,
owning property in the state, by publication although he could
not be found within the state. While in the state of Michigan,
defendant was served by publication in Oregon and judgment
was entered by default. The Michigan resident appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States contending that the Oregon
judgment was void for want of personal service in Oregon or for
want of his appearance in the action in which it was rendered.
In holding this statutory process invalid, the Supreme Court
adopted the rule that a state cannot acquire personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant by service of process outside of
the state or by publication within the state, Justice Field using
this language:
Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into
another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave
its territories and respond to proceedings against them.
Publication of process or notice within the State where the
tribunal sits cannot create any greater obligation on the
non-resident to appear. Process sent out of it are equally
unavailing.6
* * * proceedings in a court of justice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom the
court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of
law.7
The Court defined due process of law as follows:
* * * a course of legal proceedings according to those rules
and principles which have been established in our system of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private
rights.8
It must be emphasized that the operative facts of the case
arose prior to the Fourteenth Amendment and that "due process
of law" as used by the Court refers to that term as a matter of
common law and not as a constitutional question. In spite of a
vigorous dissent by Justice Hunt, the majority of the Court
further indicated that, under this definition, due process re-
quires that, in an action in personam, a non-resident defendant
must be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court either by per-
4. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
5. Oregon Code (1870) see. 56; Oregon Code (1930) tit. 1, see. 506.
6. Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 727.
7. Id. at 733.
8. Id. at 733.
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sonal service of process on him within the state or by his volun-
tary appearance.
At the end of the opinion, however, the Court expressly ex-
cluded from the decision non-resident partnerships and indi-
viduals who were doing business within the state, and in fact
made a guarded intimation that a different rule might apply to
them. To quote:
Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require
a non-resident entering into a partnership or association
within its limits, or making contracts enforceable there, to
appoint an agent or representative in the State to receive
service of process and notice in legal proceedings instituted
with respect to such partnership, association, or contracts,
or to designate a place where such service may be made and
notice given, and provide, upon their failure, to make such
appointment or to designate such place that service may be
made upon a public officer designated for that purpose, or
in some other prescribed way, and that judgment rendered
upon such service may be binding upon the non-resident
both within and without the State.9
By this decision the Supreme Court limited the jurisdiction
of state courts over non-residents in personal actions to cases
in which the defendant had been personally served within the
state or where he had voluntarily entered a personal appearance.
It left undecided, however, the possibility of an exception in the
instance of statutory control over a non-resident doing business
within the state by service upon his local agent.
Soon after the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, several states,
acting on the foregoing expression by Justice Field, enacted
statutes authorizing substituted service on an agent of a non-
resident corporation, association, partnership, or individual do-
ing business in the state in actions in personam arising out of
such business.-
These statutes were subsequently litigated in Kentucky," Indi-
ana,' 2 Iowa, 3 and Tennessee ;14 and, in each of these instances,
9. Id. at 735.
10. Ind. Rev. Stats. (1881) sec. 309; Iowa Code Supp. (1907) see. 3532;
Ky. Carroll's Civil Code (7th ed. 1927) tit. 4, sec. 51, subsec. 6; Del. Rev.
Code (1893) tit. 102, see. 2, c. 192; Tenn. Code (1896) see. 4535.
11. Guenther v. American Steel Hoop Co. (1903) 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W.
419; Johnson v. Westerfield (1911) 143 Ky. 10, 135 S. W. 425; Crane v.
Hall (1915) 165 Ky. 827, 178 S. W. 1096.
12. Rauber v. Whitney (1890) 125 Ind. 216, 25 N. E. 186; Behn v.
Whitney (1890) 125 Ind. 599, 25 N. E. 187; Edwards v. Van Cleave (1911)
47 Ind. App. 347, 94 N. E. 596.
13. Murphy v. Albany Pecan Development Co. (1915) 169 Iowa 542, 151
N. W. 500.
14. Greene v. Snyder (1904) 114 Tenn. 100, 84 S. W. 808.
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the court upheld the statute enacted by its state. Each state
assumed that its legislature had the power to enact the statute
and that it was valid under the implied exception of Pennoyer v.
Neff. 15 In each case an individual non-resident was doing busi-
ness in the state through a local agent and service was obtained
over the non-resident through his agent.
In the Kentucky case of Guenther v. American Steel Hoop Co.10
the court, passing on the constitutionality of the statute, said:
We can not see that section 2 of article 4 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States has any application. * * * Legal
remedies may be allowed against those who are domiciled
without the state which are not allowed against those who
are domiciled within the state. * * * The legislature of a
state may classify litigants according to the impracticability
of obtaining personal service of process, and authorize sub-
stituted service when necessary to the administration of
justice. * * * This right of the state seems to be expressly
recognized by the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff.17
On the other hand, some states in which the matter was liti-
gated held that such statutes were unconstitutional. 8 The Minne-
sota court in the case of Cabanne v. Graff," arising under cir-
cumstances similar to those in the previously mentioned cases,
said:
Pennoyer v. Neff is the leading authority in support of
the now well-settled proposition that, except in proceedings
affecting the personal status of the plaintiff, or in rem, * * *
no state can authorize its courts to compel a citizen of an-
other state remaining therein to come before them and sub-
mit to their decision a mere claim upon him for a money
demand, no matter what the prescribed mode of service of
process against him may be. An attempt to do so is not due
process of law. 20
The court further emphasized that the exception in the opinion
of Pennoyer v. Neff applied only to corporations which the state
15. (1877) 95 U. S. 714, 735.
16. (1903) 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W. 419.
17. Id. at 590, 76 S. W. at 421.
18. Caldwell v. Armour & Co. (Del. 1899) 1 Pen. 545, 43 Atl. 517;
Flexner v. Farson (1915) 268 Ill. 435, 109 N. E. 327; Aikman v. Sanderson
(1908) 122 La. 265, 47 So. 600; Cabanne v. Graff (1902) 87 Minn. 510,
92 N. W. 461, 59 L. R. A. 735; see also Joel v. Bennett (1916) 276 Ill. 537,
115 N. E. 5, limiting the validity of the Illinois statute to persons who are
non-residents of the county where service was had, but who are residents
of the state.
19. (1902) 87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461, 59 L. R. A. 735.
20. Id. at 513, 92 N. W. at 462.
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had the power to exclude and so could force to consent to such
service, thus:
Such non-resident [natural] person, unlike a corporation,
carries on business in this state not by virtue of its consent,
but by virtue of the federal constitution which guarantees to
the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several states; hence it cannot be implied
from the fact that he does business within the state that he
consents to submit himself to the jurisdiction of its courts
in personal actions upon service of process on his agent.21
The lower federal courts, without exception, held the state
statutes unconstitutional in their application to individual non-
residents doing business in the state,22 the same distinction be-
ing made between corporations and individuals as was made in
the Minnesota case of Cabanne v. Graff;23 unconstitutionality was
based on the discriminatory nature of the statutes as a violation
of the privileges and immunities and the due process clauses.
The problem finally reached the Supreme Court of the United
States in the 1919 case of Flexner v. Farson.24 After reciting the
facts that a money judgment had been rendered in Kentucky
against an individual resident of Illinois through service on his
agent, that the agency in Kentucky had terminated prior to the
time of service, that the action arose out of a transaction in
Kentucky, and that the Supreme Court of Illinois had refused
to give full faith and credit to the Kentucky judgment, Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court, said:
It is argued that the pleas tacitly admit that Washington
Flexner was agent of the firm at the time of the transaction
sued upon in Kentucky and the Kentucky statute is con-
strued as purporting to make him agent to receive service
in suits arising out of the business done in that State. On
this construction it is said that the defendants by doing
business in the State consented to be bound by the service
prescribed. The analogy of suits against insurance com-
panies is invoked. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v.
Phelps 190 U. S. 147. But the consent that is said to be
implied in such cases is a mere fiction, founded upon the
accepted doctrine that the States could exclude foreign cor-
porations altogether, and therefore could establish this obli-
21. Id. at 514, 92 N. W. at 462.
22. Brooks v. Dun (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1882) 51 Fed. 138; Rayla Market
Co. v. Armour & Co. (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1900) 102 Fed. 530; Moredock v.
Kirby (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1902) 118 Fed. 180.
23. (1902) 87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461, 59 L. R. A. 735.
24. (1919) 248 U. S. 289.
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gation as a condition to letting them in. * * " The State
had no power to exclude the defendants, and on that ground
without going further, the Supreme Court of Illinois right-
fully held that the analogy failed, and that the Kentuckyjudgment was void. If the Kentucky statute purports to
have the effect attributed to it, it cannot have that effect in
the present case. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy,
241 U. S. 518, 522, 523.25
The scope of statutory service on the agent of a non-resident
doing business in the state was thus limited to corporations. The
Court reasoned that, since a foreign corporation can be excluded
from doing business within a state, the state may require its
consent to such service as a condition to being admitted. But,
under the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution,
individuals cannot be excluded. Hence they cannot be required
to consent to such service, but rather, under the authority of
Pennoyer v. Neff, must be served personally within the juris-
diction or make a voluntary appearance.
Several states accepted the decision in Flexner v. Farson as
conclusive.2 6 Kentucky 27 and Tennessee, 28 where statutes had
previously upheld service on the agent of a non-resident indi-
vidual doing business in the state, reversed their prior decisions
on the ground that it was not due process of law to enter a per-
sonal judgment by substituted service upon a non-resident indi-
vidual, partnership, or unincorporated association composed of
persons none of whom appeared or was served within the juris-
diction.
In these circumstances there would appear to be little doubt
that service on the local agent of a non-resident individual would
be void. But Mr. Justice Holmes did not carry his analogy far
enough. Even in the earlier case of International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky 9 the Supreme Court had held valid a statute pro-
viding for service through the agent of a foreign corporation
engaged in interstate commerce (which cannot be excluded from
doing business in a state and in that sense is analogous to an
individual). This decision was based upon the ground that al-
25. Id. at 293.
26. Carroll v. Curran (1920) 193 App. Div. 948, 184 N. Y. S. 603;
Andrews Bros. v. McClanahan (1927) 220 Ky. 504, 295 S. W. 457; Knox
Bros. v. C. W. Wagner & Co. (1918) 141 Tenn. 348, 209 S. W. 638.
27. Andrews Bros. v. McClanahan (1927) 220 Ky. 504, 295 S. W. 457;
Greene v. Commonwealth (1938) 275 Ky. 637, 122 S. W. (2d) 523.
28. Knox Bros. v. E. W. Wagner & Co. (1918) 141 Tenn. 348, 209 S. W.
638; Frolich & Barbour v. Hanson (1927) 155 Tenn. 601, 296 S. W. 353.
29. (1914) 234 U. S. 579.
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though the state could not refuse entry to such a corporation it
could still impose reasonable conditions on it. We may take this
ruling and a similar line of cases to be noted as upholding rea-
sonable regulations in the exercise of a state's police power.
This decision throws doubt on the reasoning in Flexner v.
Farson. Is the power to exclude the true test for jurisdiction?
In the non-resident motorist cases the Supreme Court had also
already furnished another possible inroad on the reasoning be-
hind Flexner v. Farson. In 1916, Kane v. New Jersey0 had
raised the question of the constitutionality of a New Jersey
statute imposing upon a non-resident motorist the duty to ex-
pressly authorize the Secretary of State to receive service of
process in actions against him arising out of the operation of
his car within the state. The Court upheld the statute as a valid
exercise of the police power and held that the statute did not
violate the privileges and immunities clause.
Subsequent to Flexner v. Farson, a further advance in the law
concerning non-resident motorists was made by the Supreme
Court in Hess v. Pawloski.31 There the Court upheld a Massa-
chusetts statute which provided that the mere use of the high-
ways by a non-resident would be deemed an appointment of the
Secretary of State to receive process for him in an action arising
out of the operation of his car within the state.
But a reasonable qualification on these holdings was made in
Wuchter v. Pizzutti32 in which the Supreme Court ruled that, if
a "non-resident motorist" statute were to be valid, it must make
such adequate provision for notice to the defendant as to satisfy
the requirements of due process of law.
The liberal tendency evidenced by these decisions encouraged
state courts again to uphold, as not infringing either the privi-
leges and immunities or the due process clause, carefully drafted
statutes, providing for substituted service on a non-resident indi-
vidual doing business in the state in actions arising out of that
business.
Pennsylvania and Iowa have such statutes.33 The courts of
these states have recently upheld the validity of substituted ser-
vice on an individual non-resident engaged in the sale of securi-
ties in the state through an agent.34
30. 242 U. S. 160.
31. (1927) 274 U. S. 352.
32. (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 53 A. L. R. 1230.
33. Iowa Code (1931) sec. 11946; Pa. Purdon's Stats. (1936) tit. 12, see.
297.
34. Stoner v. Higginson (1934) 316 Pa. 481, 175 AtI. 527; Davidson v.
Doherty (1932) 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A. L. R. 1308.
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The Supreme Court of the United States in Doherty v. Good-
man?5 has upheld the validity of the Iowa statute as applied to a
non-resident individual engaged in the sale of securities in the
state by an agent, the Court holding that neither the privileges
and immunities nor the due process clause was abridged by the
statute. The Court unfortunately, however, expressly limited the
decision to cases involving the sale of securities.
The most recent case bearing upon the problem is Dubin v,
Lesher" wherein a lower Pennsylvania court upheld the validity
of a Pennsylvania statute providing for service on the Secretary
of the Commonwealth in an action in tort arising out of the
negligent failure of a non-resident owner of Pennsylvania prop-
erty to keep the property in good repair. But the question of
the ultimate validity of such statutes when applied to the ordi-
nary business agency instituted in a state by a non-resident is
still undetermined.
II
In the light of this presentation of the leading cases, the deci-
sions may now be analyzed to show the likelihood that the valid-
ity, under such statutes, of service on the agent of a non-resident
individual engaged in ordinary business activities in another
state will be sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Since the cases bearing upon the problem are few, it
will be necessary to make most of the necessary deductions and
inferences from those few which are helpful.
Doherty v. Goodman"7 is the most recent Supreme Court case
pertaining to this problem, and it comes the closest to upholding
the validity of the statutes as applied to non-resident individuals
doing ordinary business in the state through an agent. In that
case Doherty, a citizen of New York, employed King as agent
to manage an Iowa office for the sale of securities. Goodman
sued Doherty in Iowa on a cause of action arising out of the sale
of stock through King. Service was had on the agent under the
terms of the Iowa statute which provided:
When a corporation, company or individual has for the
transaction of any business, an office or agency in any
county other than that in which the principal resides service
may be made on any agent or clerk employed in such office
or agency, in all actions growing out of or connected with
the business of that office or agency.88
35. (1935) 294 U. S. 623.
36. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 19, 1938, p. 1: 2; Comment (1938)
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 119.
37. (1935) 294 U. S. 623.
38. Supra, note 33.
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When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States,
Mr. Justice McReynolds quoted at length from the decision of the
Iowa court upholding the statute.30 His opinion reaffirmed the
several possible bases for entertaining jurisdiction:
1. The statute does not abridge the privileges and immunities
clause of the Constitution, since both residents and non-residents
of Iowa are amenable to suit in the county in which the agency
is established in an action arising out of the business of the
agency.
2. The statute imposes the same burden upon residents and
non-residents and, instead of discriminating against non-resi-
dents, tends to put them on the same footing as residents.
3. The statute does not abridge the due process clause of the
Constitution, since its provisions are such that there is not only
reasonable probability but practical moral certainty that the de-
fendant will receive notice of the pendency of the action in ample
time to appear and defend.
4. The establishment of a business within the state is equiva-
lent to the voluntary appointment of an agent to receive service
of process under the statute.
5. Four essentials must be established: there must be an office
or agency within the state; the office or agency must be in a
county other than that in which the principal resides; the action
must grow out of or be connected with the business of that office
or agency; and the agent must be employed in that office or
agency at the time of service upon him.
The Court said that Flexner v. Farson could not sustain
Doherty's contention. The distinction made was that in the
earlier case process was issued to one who was not the agent of
the defendant at the time of service. Here King was agent at
the time of service. In upholding the validity of the Iowa statute
in this particular instance, the Court said:
Doherty voluntarily established an office in Iowa and there
carried on this business. Considering this fact, and accept-
ing the construction given to §11079, we think to apply it
as here proposed will not deprive him of any right guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution. 0
The scope of the decision was then limited to rights claimed un-
der the present record, and possible limitations of the statute
under different circumstances were not considered.
What has led the Court to reach these conclusions, and how
39. See cases cited supra, note 34.
40. Doherty v. Goodman (1935) 294 U. S. 623, 628.
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far may we expect it to go in aplying them? Will they be applied
to a non-resident engaged through an agent in business other
than the sale of securities?
We have seen that at an early date the courts generally re-
stricted the scope of similar statutes to foreign corporations en-
gaged in intrastate business and usually refused to uphold their
validity when directed to non-resident individuals. The reason-
ing of the earlier cases was that corporations could be excluded
unless they were engaged in interstate commerce, and hence con-
ditions could be imposed on their entry into the state; but that
under the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution
an individual could not be excluded, and consequently conditions
could not be imposed on his entry. So, also, it was thought that
the commerce clause prevented extensive regulation of foreign
corporations engaged in interstate business.
This theory was overthrown by International Harvester Co. v.
Kentuccky.41 There a foreign corporation engaged in interstate
business was prosecuted in Kentucky by service on its local agent.
The corporation contended that, as it could not be excluded from
the state, Kentucky had no ground on which it could force the
corporation to consent to substituted service. The Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the validity of the service, saying:
We are satisfied that the presence of a corporation within
a State necessary to the service of process is shown when it
appears that the corporation is carrying on business in such
sense as to manifest its presence within the State, although
the business transacted may be entirely interstate in its
character. In other words, this fact alone does not render
the corporation immune from the ordinary process of the
courts of the State.42
Thus jurisdiction over a foreign corporation engaged in inter-
state commerce may be had by substituted service on its agent,
although it cannot, as in the case of an ordinary corporation, be
excluded from entering the state. The state, even though it can-
not exclude, may as a part of its police power impose reasonable
conditions on the doing of business within its boundaries. 43
41. (1914) 234 U. S. 579.
42. Id. at 589.
43. Reiblich, Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts over Foreign Corporations
Under the Act of 1937 (1938) 3 Maryland L. Rev. 54, 65, 71; Henderson,
The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law
(1918) 124; Farrier, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1933) 17
Minn. L. Rev. 270, 296. See also, Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator
Co. (1904) 198 U. S. 424; but, quaere, does it involve an inter- or intra-
state corporation?
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Consequently the analogy drawn by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Flexner v. Farson44 was not complete. Even if the Kentucky
statute was inapplicable in that particular instance, the reason
for the decision is not correct. An interstate commerce corpora-
tion that cannot be excluded, and in that sense analogous to an
individual, is amenable to suit within the state for actions arising
there, through service on its agent.
The cases involving non-resident motorists afford an even
closer analogy to individuals engaged in business activities
through an agent. Under the privileges and immunities clause a
non-resident motorist cannot be excluded; yet the Supreme Court
has frequently held that he is amenable to suit in the state in
which an accident occurred, by statutory substituted service on
the Secretary of State.45 The state's jurisdiction over him is
founded on its right, through a reasonable exercise of its police
power, to impose reasonable conditions on the entry of the non-
resident motorist.
In Kane v. New Jersey- the Court said:
* * * in view of the speed of the automobile and the
habits of men, we cannot say that the Legislature of New
Jersey was unreasonable in believing that ability to estab-
lish, by legal proceedings within the State, any financial
liability of non-resident owners, was essential to public
safety. There is nothing to show that the requirement is
unduly burdensome in practice. It is not a discrimination
against non-residents, denying them equal protection of the
law. On the contrary, it puts non-resident owners upon an
equality with resident owners.47
And, in Hess 97. Pawloski,4 it was said:
In the public interest the State may make and enforce
regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the
part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use the
highways. * * * Under the statute the implied consent is
limited to proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions
on a highway in which the non-resident may be involved.
It is required that he shall actually receive and receipt for
notice of the service and a copy of the process. And it con-
templates such continuances as may be found necessary to
give reasonable time and opportunity for defense. It makes
44. (1919) 248 U. S. 289.
45. Kane v. New Jersey (1916) 242 U. S. 160; Hess v. Pawloski (1927)
274 U. S. 352; Wuchter v. Pizzutti (1928) 276 U. S. 13, 57 A. L. R. 1230.
46. (1916) 242 U. S. 160.
47. Id. at 167.
48. (1927) 274 U. S. 352.
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no hostile discrimination against non-residents but tends to
put them on the same footing as residents. Literal and pre-
cise equality in this respect is not attainable; it is not re-
quired.49
Thus a non-resident individual driving his car in a foreign
state is amenable there to process in an action arising out of an
accident on its highways. His express consent is not needed.
Jurisdiction is based on the theory that the state can, through
the exercise of its police power, impose reasonable conditions
on the operation, by a foreigner, of a dangerous vehicle within
the confines of the state. As the Court has pointed out, such
statutes are valid if they are limited to causes of action arising
within the state and if they adequately provide for notice to the
defendant.
The Supreme Court relied on these "non-resident motorist"
cases as its authority to uphold the validity of the Iowa statute
in Doherty v. Goodman, saying:
The power of the States to impose terms upon non-resi-
dents, as to activities within their borders, recently has been
much discussed. (Citing Hess v. Pawloski, Wutcher v.
Pizzutti and Young v. Masci.) * * * Under these opinions
it is established doctrine that a State may rightly direct
that non-residents who operate automobiles on her highways
shall be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as
agent to receive service of process, provided there is some
"provision making it reasonably probable that notice of the
service on the Secretary will be communicated to the non-
resident defendant who is sued."
So far as it affects appellant, the questioned statute goes
no farther than the principle approved by these opinions
permit."
The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided the
effect of a statute of this nature when applied to a non-resident
individual doing ordinary business within the state. As pointed
out before,51 there was a great amount of divergency on this
point in the earlier decisions of the state and lower Federal
Courts.
This confusion is not surprising since the early statutes were
passing through an "ironing out" process. The developing statu-
tory types were new to the courts and were for the most part
poorly and improperly drafted, nor was it settled as to what
49. Id. at 356.
50. Doherty v. Goodman (1935) 294 U. S. 623, 628.
51. See pages 95, 96, supra.
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extent foreign corporations could be regulated without violation
of the commerce clause. Neither is it surprising that many of
the courts should, under the apparent exception in Pennoyer v.
Neff, for the most part uphold the statutes to the fullest extent.
The welfare of the state was undoubtedly a primary considera-
tion, but the question was as to what extent it could be carried.
The conflict in opinion arose when the federal courts and a
few state courts began holding the statutes void as a violation
of the privileges and immunities and due process clauses of the
Federal Constitution. A typical example is found in Moredock v.
Kirby52 in which the court, after refusing to uphold the Kentucky
statute on the ground that it was discriminatory in that only non-
residents were subject to substituted service, used the following
language and cited Pennojer v. Neff as its authority:
The state of Kentucky being forbidden by the Constitution
of the United States to pass any law which would deprive
the defendant of his property without due process of law,
it is not permissible for the state to enact a statute which
enables its courts to render a judgment against him without
a personal service of process upon him "within the state,"
and in this way deprive him of his property. * * * this result
is emphasized and vindicated to the moral as well as the
legal sense by those principles of law which so equitably
require that constructive or substituted service, such as here
attempted, shall fail in such case because the principles of
natural justice demand personal service of process as an
indispensable basis of jurisdiction over a defendant who
does not voluntarily enter his appearance.53
Several courts considered the above rule to be confirmed in
the United States Supreme Court decision of Flexner v. Farson."
How then can we account for the recent Supreme Court decisions
in the cases of the foreign corporations engaged in interstate
business, non-resident motorists, and non-resident security deal-
ers?
In the first place, the age-old rule in Michigan Trust Co. v.
Ferry"5 of physical power as a requisite to jurisdiction, on which
the courts in earlier years relied, has been greatly modified by
the Supreme Court of the United States. It is no longer an un-
equivocal test.56
52. (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1902) 118 Fed. 180.
53. Id. at 186.
54. See cases cited supra, note 25.
55. (1913) 228 U. S. 346.
56. Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions (1929) 23 IiM. L. Rev. 427,
434, and cases cited.
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There has developed a modern interpretation of due process
in its application to service of process on proposed defendants,
where personal service cannot be had. Under it the essential
elements of due process in this connection are notice to the pro-
posed defendant and opportunity to defend.57
The last and most important change to consider is that the
statutes under which the recent cases of the foreign corporations
engaged in interstate business, non-resident motorists, and non-
resident security dealers were decided have been revised and
adapted to modern conditions. They were drafted to avoid dis-
crimination between residents and non-residents, and reasonable
provision was made to assure adequate notice to the defendant.
These developments in statutory drafting are recognized and
mirrored in the Iowa case of Davidson v. Doherty58 and the Penn-
sylvania case of Stoner v. Higginson.59
The Iowa court recognized that one state may not exclude a
citizen of another state from doilng business within its bounda-
ries. But it further recognized that the Constitution does not pro-
hibit the imposition of reasonable conditions upon a non-resident
who seeks to do business within the forum, and that this is a
proper exercise of legislative power, especially when like condi-
tions are imposed on its own citizens. Consequently such a stat-
ute, the court said, does not in any way abridge the privileges
and immunities of the citizens of the several states. The Penn-
sylvania court is in accord. We have seen that the Supreme
Court of the United States in Doherty v. Goodman adopted much
of the reasoning of the Iowa court in sustaining the statute in
its application to a non-resident dealer in securities but that it
limited the validity of the statute to a reasonable exercise of
police power.60
The court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, in the recent case
of Dubin v. Lesher,l has extended the application of the prin-
ciples discussed above in holding that a non-resident owner of
property in Pennsylvania may, by statute, become subject to suit
for a tort arising out of his failure to keep property in good
57. Hess v. Pawloski (1927) 274 U. S. 352, 356; Wuchter v. Pizzutti
(1928) 276 U. S. 13, 24, 57 A. L. R. 1230; Doherty v. Goodman (1935)
294 U. S. 623, 627.
58. (1932) 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700, 91 A. L. R. 1308.
59. (1934) 316 Pa. 481, 175 Atl. 527. This and the case in the preced-
ing note arose on almost identical facts involving actions arising out of the
sale of securities through an agent in the forum by a non-resident security
dealer. Service in each case was had on the agent of the non-resident.
60. See page 99, supra.
61. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 19, 1938, p. 1: 2; Comment (1938)
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 119.
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repair. The statute provides for service on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, notice being sent the non-resident by mail. In
upholding the application of the statute the court stated: "It is
just as important that a non-resident owner of real estate keep
it in good repair as it is that he drive his automobile with due
regard to the safety of others." The decision is an extension of
the exercise of police power to a new type of activity, and al-
though from an inferior tribunal the decision is indicative of the
growing tendency to uphold such statutory service on non-resi-
dent individuals by reason of the recognized rights of the state
to prescribe reasonable conditions to various activities within its
boundaries.
We may now consider the possibility that the Supreme Court
of the United States will uphold service, under statutes of the
types and with the safeguards discussed, on the local agent of
a non-resident individual engaged in business other than the sale
of securities within the state.
The Supreme Court has refused to rule on the question until
it is brought directly before the Court.6 2 It is submitted that the
statutes may be upheld in this particular application. Already
the Supreme Court in Doherty v. Goodman has expressly ruled
that Flexner v. Farson is not in point. Although the Court has
not overruled the Flexner case, it has established a basis of
jurisdiction over non-residents which appears to have that ef-
fect.
It has been seen that the Supreme Court has recognized that
an extended basis of jurisdiction lies in the right of a state,
through the exercise of its police power, to prescribe reasonable
conditions to the doing of certain acts within its boundaries by
non-resident corporations engaged in interstate business, non-
resident motorists, and non-resident security dealers. The valid-
ity of the substituted service on an agent in the state is upheld
on the ground that, by entering the state to do business, the non-
resident voluntarily submits to the conditions prescribed by the
state. And the Doherty case clearly shows that a properly drafted
statute can avoid conflicting with the due process and the privi-
leges and immunities clauses.
The Supreme Court has thus recognized, as a reasonable and
proper basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, the legislative power
of a state to exercise its police power in imposing reasonable
conditions and regulations on the doing of certain acts within
the state. If the Supreme Court adheres to its present theory,
62. Doherty v. Goodman (1935) 294 U. S. 623.
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the validity of statutes applying to an individual non-resident
engaged in ordinary business in the state by an agent, will de-
pend upon whether such an application is a reasonable exercise
of the police power. It is submitted that carefully drafted stat-
utes will be upheld on that ground. The scope of the police power
may well be extended to include regulation of ordinary business.
"It embraces regulation designed to promote public convenience
or the general prosperity or welfare."8 3 And it is to be expected
that if the Supreme Court does uphold the validity of the statutes
in this application, the decision will be based on an extension of
the police power.
The question whether the Court will permit an extension of
the scope of the police power to include the statutory service of
process upon the agent of a non-resident individual doing ordi-
nary business in the state will depend on whether the Court is
convinced that there is a need for such an extension.
It is submitted that there is such a need. Unless statutory ser-
vice of this sort is authorized, a non-resident may engage in
business in another state through a local agent; and, unless he
owns property within the state or makes a voluntary appearance,
he may not be amenable to suit in that state for a cause of action
arising out of business there transacted. The resident of the
state who has traded with the agent of the non-resident may be
required to leave his domicil and go to the domicil of the non-
resident to sue there on his cause of action. It is obvious that a
situation of this sort is susceptible of abuse. Many residents
having claims arising out of business transactions in the state
with the agent of the non-resident will not be in a position to
enforce them.
The justice of the statutes is undeniable. They do not place
a different burden on the non-resident than on the resident of the
state. If a resident individual engages, through an agent, in busi-
ness in a county other than the one in which he lives, he is an-
swerable in that county in an action arising out of his business
done there. Why then should not a non-resident be amenable to
suit in the same manner? "It may be that a non-resident will
not have to go as far as a resident to appear."0 4 Furthermore,
a non-resident who gets all the benefits of the protection of the
laws of the state with regard to the office or agency set up in the
state, and with regard to the business there transacted, ought
63. Sligh v. Kirkwood (1915) 237 U. S. 52.
64. Davidson v. Doherty (1932) 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700, 702, 91
A. L. R. 1308.
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to be amenable to the laws of the state as to transactions grow-
ing out of such business on the same bases and conditions as
govern residents of the state.
If logic and reason prevail, as these questions again come be-
fore the Court, it may be expected that properly drafted statutes
providing for service on a non-resident engaged in ordinary busi-
ness in the state, through service on an agent there, will be up-
held by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Roy CosPER.
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BY LUMP SUM AWARD
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
During the past quarter of a century the legislatures of forty-
six states passed workmen's compensation acts designed to cor-
rect an outmoded system of determining fault by negligence in
industrial accidents, but in their plans they gave scant attention
to the position of the lawyer. The various schemes usually pro-
vided for the lawyer's presence in the hearing before the com-
mission, and many acts contained simple provisions for the pay-
ment of his fees. But the draftsmen did not anticipate that pay-
ment of attorneys' fees would become a major problem which
today faces the administration of workmen's compensation. The
size of contingent fees which some lawyers have collected, their
attempt to commute an award to secure lump sum payment, their
ambulance-chasing activities, have all occasioned a flood of con-
demnatory criticism.
According to Walter F. Dodd:
The ambulance-chasing activities of certain runners and
lawyers run riot in some jurisdictions, and such persons
often succeed in entrenching themselves so firmly upon com-
pensation practice that it is very difficult to shake them
off.,
Workmen's compensation is designed to award to an injured
worker or his family small payments aggregating the most ade-
quate compensation possible in each case, and the very nature
of workmen's compensation suggests that attorney fees should
account for but a small part of the costs.2 But that some lawyers
1. Administration of Workmen's Compensation (1936) 304.
2. In Illinois Zinc Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1934) 355 Ill. 253, 189 N. E.
310, 311, the court said: "The fundamental purpose of the Workmen's
Compensation Act * * * is to recompense, partially, the workman for his
loss of earnings or earning power by reason of the injuries suffered, arising
out of and in the course of his employment. In the event that the death
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